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Many politicians and business leaders are advocating
high deductible health insurance plans linked with
health savings accounts—so-called consumer-directed
healthcare. These policies penalize the sick, discourage
needed care (especially primary and preventive care),
and direct tax subsidies towards the wealthiest Amer-
icans. They offer little hope of slowing the growth of
health care costs and add further bureaucratic costs
and complexity to our health care financing system.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumer-directed healthcare (CDHC) is center stage in
health policy debates. Many politicians and corporate leaders
hope that high deductible health insurance policies will cut
costs by coaxing people to think twice before visiting the
emergency department (ED), drug store, or MRI suite. The
basic idea is that Americans are too well insured; if they spend
their own money – so the logic goes – they will spend it more
wisely.
Sometimes, after a morning in the clinic during cold season
when we are inundated with snifflers seeking antibiotics, we
see the attraction of such incentives. But then comes a patient
with sniffles and pneumonia, or a diabetic heading toward a
foot amputation for want of timely podiatric care and reluc-
tance to endure constant needling, or a woman looking for any
excuse to put off the discomfort and embarrassment of a
mammogram or pelvic exam, or a middle-aged man who finds
the prospect of colonoscopy disquieting. Little of what we do to
our patients is pleasant for them, and past studies indicate
that patients facing steep out-of-pocket costs skip vital care,
not just useless visits.
1
Medical care differs from most consumer goods. So far as we
know, there is no biological need for a flat-panel television.
True, clothing, food, and shelter are necessities, but neither
bad genes nor bad luck compels you to buy the high-priced
versions—those purchases are generally driven by comfort,
aesthetics, or social norms, not fear for life and limb.
For patients, the luck of the draw usually dictates the care
they must buy. Men do not require Pap smears, birth control
pills, obstetrical care, or routine breast exams. Americans of
European descent rarely suffer sickle cell disease, or non-Jews
Tay Sachs. Diabetes and cancer – which reflect a mix of bad
luck and bad choices – do not just bring medical complica-
tions; they bring financial ones as well. In addition, CDHC ups
the ante, amplifying the financial consequences of both bad
luck and unfortunate choices.
PLAYING THE NUMBERS
Consumer-directed healthcare policies offer lower premiums in
exchange for higher deductibles—at least $1,050 per person
and $2,100 per family annually, often as high as $10,000
annually. In the ideal case, such plans are coupled with health
savings accounts (HSAs)—tax-free accounts that can be used
to pay for the deductible and for medical services like cosmetic
surgery that are entirely excluded from coverage. However, half
of CDHC enrollees have nothing in their HSAs.
2
Under CDHC, healthy people with very low medical
expenses win; they get lower premiums and pay only trivial
additional amounts out-of-pocket. However, others lose. The
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) – which collects
detailed medical spending data on a nationally representative
sample of Americans – allows prediction of some likely losers.
Using data from the 2003 MEPS,
3 we tabulated the
numbers and proportions of insured individuals with various
conditions whose health care costs exceeded $1,050 or $2,100,
as well as the mean and median expenditures for these groups.
Precise modeling of CDHC’s financial impact is difficult for
several reasons: (1) the complexity of the thousands of different
CDHC plans now on the market; (2) variability in families’
marginal tax rates, which determine the size of the tax subsidy
to HSAs (those with higher incomes generally enjoy larger tax
subsidies); (3) variations in families’ insurance coverage (in
some families, husbands, wives, children, and step children
have different coverage); and (4) the fact that individuals’
coverage may change in the course of a year. However, the
Federal Government’s thresholds for defining high deductible
health plans that qualify for HSA tax exemptions – $1,050 for
an individual and $2,100 for a family – provide a reasonable
estimate of the spending levels likely to delineate winners from
losers.
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879We inflated 2003 spending figures to 2006 dollars using
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ projected change
in per capita personal health expenditures between 2003 and
2006.
4 We omitted individuals over 65 from most analyses
because most CDHC proposals exclude this group, many of
whom have costly illnesses and virtually all of whom are
covered by Medicare.
WINNERS AND LOSER
Ladies, we lose. Not only do we (including one of the authors)
suffer the pain of childbirth, but it is also expensive. Addition-
ally, we are more diligent in seeking care for chronic illnesses
like diabetes and hypertension. While only one third of insured
men under 45 hit $1,050 each year in medical costs, 55.6% of
insured young women reached this figure (Table 1). Similar
cost disparities disadvantage insured women between 45 and
65, 74.2% of whom “consume” $1,050 or more in medical care
annually. Overall, insured women’s median health expenditure
is $997 higher than men’s. Even subtracting a few hundred
dollars for the cost of mammograms and Pap smears
(exempted from the deductible in a few CDHC plans), women
are still big losers.
The odds are even worse for sick people. More than 90% of
insured diabetics cross the $1,050 annual spending mark;
more than half spend at least $5,000. Similar figures apply to
the millions of people with heart disease, emphysema, arthri-
tis, or a history of stroke. Even hypertension or asthma makes
you a very bad bet to stay under $1,050, or even $2,100.
Most kids are lucky—they use less than $500 worth of care
each year. However, needing even a single prescription medi-
cation changes the odds. Of the 12.1 million insured kids in
that category, 58.6% zoomed past $1,050.
CDHC: A BAD BET
Women, with rare exceptions, do not choose their sex. Yet,
CDHC will penalize them, as well as men whose major sin is
chronic illness, and many of us who are turning gray.
Moreover, as healthy, low-cost patients flee to CDHC plans,
premiums for the sick who remain in non-CDHC coverage will
skyrocket. Already in the Federal Employee Health Benefits
Program, CDHC plans are segregating young, higher-income
men from the costlier female and older workers.
5 For Wal-
Mart’s management, shifting to CDHC plans is an explicit
strategy to push sicker, high-cost workers to quit.
6
Consumer-directed healthcare also seems unfair and un-
wise on other accounts. It seems unfair because the HSA’s tax
breaks selectively reward the wealthiest Americans. A single
mother with one child who makes $16,000 annually would
save $19.60 in income taxes by putting $2,000 into an HSA.
7 A
similar mom earning $450,000 would save $720 in taxes.
It seems unwise because CDHC incentives selectively dis-
courage low-cost primary and preventive care. Even 1 day in
the hospital would push a patient past the deductible thresh-
old, eliminating any cost-saving incentives for the small group
of sick patients who account for the vast majority of health
Table 1. Mean and Median per Capita Health Spending and Percentage Spending Less than $1,050 and $2,100 Among Insured Americans
According to Age, Sex, and Diagnosis, 2006




Percent of individuals with
annual expenditure <$1,050





5.196 10,760 5,774 8.6 17.0
Receiving therapy
for arthritis
9.657 10,277 5,425 7.2 20.1
Diagnosed
hypertension
26.867 7,035 3,161 21.7 37.3
Asthma attack in
the past year
6.887 5,823 2,478 26.9 45.2
Diagnosis of angina
or CHD




12.121 2,673 1,305 41.4 65.4
History of stroke 1.833 14,793 8,487 6.5 13.4
Diagnosis of
emphysema
1.050 10,213 4,785 15.1 24.7
Males
0–18 years 32,184 1,535 452 70.6 83.8
18–44 years 35.165 2,766 463 66.9 80.5
45–64 years 26.728 5,947 1,849 37.6 53.8
>64 14.514 9,943 4,231 18.0 29.2
Females
0–18 years 30.292 1,356 450 71.8 84.8
18–44 years 39.628 3,363 1,266 44.4 62.8
45–64 years 28.279 5,974 2,871 25.8 41.3
>64 years 19.864 9,320 4,334 14.6 27.7
Males 18–64 61.892 4,140 847 54.2 69.0
Females 18–64 67.907 4,451 1,844 36.7 53.8
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disease trying to decide whether their chest pain warrants an
ED visit would skimp; or perhaps a young woman whose
abdominal pain may be caused by indigestion, or an ectopic
pregnancy; or a young man with mild hypertension.
Consumer-directed healthcare incentives to skimp on these
relatively low-cost services are unlikely to constrain overall
health spending. The United States already has the world’s
highest out-of-pocket spending and the highest health costs.
Copayments in Switzerland – a nation near the top of the
health spending charts – have not reduced total health
expenditures.
8 In Canada, charging copayments had little
impact on costs; doctors less frequently saw the poor (and
often sick) patients who could not pay, but their appointment
slots were filled by more affluent patients who could.
9,10 This
offset has not been examined in U.S. studies that are the basis
for the claim that copayments reduce costs. Higher copay-
ments for medications in Quebec resulted in increased ED
visits, hospitalizations, and deaths for the poor and elderly,
11
confirming the Rand experiment finding in the United States
that copayments increase the risk of dying for the sick poor.
1
Moreover, CDHC and HSAs add new layers of expensive
health care bureaucracy. Already, insurers and investment
firms are vying for the estimated $1 billion annually in fees for
managing HSAs, and Blue Cross and UnitedHealth have
chartered their own banks and announced special health care
credit cards
12—presumably charging hefty interest to patients
with empty HSAs. Patients must assiduously document their
out-of-pocket payments to assure that coverage kicks in once
the deductible is met. For doctors, CDHC means collecting fees
directly from patients, many of them unable to pay, a task even
costlier than billing insurers.
13 Moreover, doctors and patients
will still have to play by insurers’ utilization review and other
rules—failure to do so disqualifies bills from counting toward
the patient’s deductible.
Some propose mitigating CDHC’s adverse effects by waiving
out-of-pocket costs for some high-value services such as
recommended preventive care. This approach would add
complexity to our already Byzantine reimbursement system.
Accurately linking out-of-pocket cost to clinical value – as they
suggest – would require much more than a list of procedures.
For instance, the cost effectiveness of a pap smear depends on
the details of sexual history. Are we really to report to insurers
the number of lifetime male sexual partners for each of our
female patients? Additionally, how will insurers tailor financial
incentives to get patients to the ED promptly if their undiag-
nosed chest pain signifies cardiac ischemia, but not if it is
heartburn?
Behind the rhetoric of consumer responsiveness and per-
sonal responsibility, CDHC sets in motion huge resource
transfers. The sick and middle-aged pay more, whereas the
young and healthy pay less. Women spend more, whereas men
spend less. Workers bear more of the burden, whereas employ-
ers bear less. The poor skip vital care while the rich enjoy tax-
free tummy tucks. And, as in every health reform in memory,
bureaucrats and insurance firms walk off with an ever larger
share of health dollars.
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